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Abstract:
Human decision making is a process guided by different and partly competing motiva-
tions that can each dominate behavior and lead to different effects depending on strength
and circumstances. ‘Over-stylizing’ neglects such competing concerns and context-depen-
dence, although it facilitates the emergence of elaborate general theories. We illustrate by
examples from social dilemma experiments and inequality aversion theories that sweep-
ing empirical claims should be avoided.
1. Introduction
Consider the following statements. (a) ‘Even in one-shot prisoners’ dilemma
experiments there is a lot of cooperation.’ (b) ‘In repeated game experiments
participants start out cooperating and defect only shortly before the end of the
interaction.’ (c) ‘People engage in costly punishment without a future-directed
preventive incentive.’ These statements are ambiguous in themselves. On the
one hand, they may be read as implicitly containing an existential quantiﬁer. In
this case, they would only claim that there exist game interactions in which they
hold, thereby providing evidence against general statements as implied, e.g., by
the traditional assumption of wealth maximizing behavior. On the other hand,
the above statements may be regarded themselves as being general. Then the
implicit quantiﬁer would be a universal one.
Since beating to death poor homo oeconomicus another time is not exciting,
interpreting statements (a)–(c) as ‘there exist situations such that ...’ should not
stir up much interest. Yet, if a statement of this form is interpreted in terms of
universal, rather than existential, quantiﬁcation, it becomes much more inter-
esting. We name statements, like (a)–(c), which are taken to apply ‘universally’
to a broad class of interactions stylized facts.
The upside of referring to stylized facts is that, based on them, new theoret-
ical approaches to classes of similar problems can be and have been developed.
Starting from statement (a), theories based on other-regarding concerns such as
altruism (Bester and Güth 1998), inequ(al)ity aversion (Bolton 1991; Fehr and240 Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt and M. Vittoria Levati
Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), and guilt aversion (Dufwenberg and
Gneezy 2000; Charness and Dufwenberg 2006) have been proposed to explain
cooperation in one-shot experiments. Taking (b) as a springboard and assum-
ing some form of incomplete information, the concept of reputation equilibrium
(Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson 1982) emerged and helped to account for
cooperation and end-game effects in repeated games. Finally, in view of (c), a
variant of reciprocity theory has been developed to justify costly punishment.1
On the down side, reliance on stylized facts has often led social theorists
seriously astray. Along with the belief that abstractness of experiments would
guarantee broad applicability of results, conﬁdence in stylized facts has induced
researchers to trust in mere speculations and daring generalizations. Notwith-
standing its fruitful uses as a heuristic within the process of theory formation,
stylizing should not be taken as a sound basis of justiﬁcation and cannot serve
as a substitute for serious testing of theories.2
In our subsequent discussion we intend to illustrate uses of ‘stylizing’ that
we regard as abuses, and to which we therefore refer as over-stylizing. We ﬁrst
put stylizing in perspective of the complexities of human motivation by means
of a prisoners’ dilemma (henceforth PD) example (section 2). Next we turn to
our main example of inequ(al)ity aversion introducing the basic concept and its
trade-off interpretation (section 3). In the following two sections we discuss two
speciﬁc problems: the lumpiness of equity concerns (section 4), and the ambigu-
ity of equity standards (section 5). The ﬁnal discussion in section 6 states that
inequ(al)ity aversion should be restricted to situations in which its more or less
implicit prerequisites are granted.
2. Stylizing and the Complexity of Human Motivation
Consider a PD game with the payoff matrix depicted in Table 1.
C2 D2
C1 11, 11 0, 12
D1 12, 0 10, 10
Table 1: PD game’s payoff matrix
Assuming that the ﬁgures in the table are monetary payoffs, one can plausibly
predict that there will hardly be any cooperation if this game is played repeat-
edly by the same two players (‘partner design’ in the experimental jargon). This
contradicts the general claim that considerable cooperation is to be expected in
1 Of course, many of the speculations are not entirely new. For example, theories of limited al-
truism, in particular among the so-called British Moralists (see Raphael 1969), theories of the
central role of retributive emotions (see Mackie 1982, and references therein), or psychological
equity theories (Walster, Walster and Berscheid 1978) have all been around for quite some time.
2 Mayo 1996 and Rubinstein 2001 are useful discussions of the methodology of experimental sci-
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PD’s that are played many periods. Likewise, the claim that even in one-shot
PD’s a considerable fraction of people cooperate is not generally true.
The validity of general hypotheses based on the above mentioned statements
(a) and (b) seems to be constrained to very speciﬁc games. Hence, the intended
realm of application of these general hypotheses needs to be restricted. In par-
ticular, one may suggest that cooperation in interactions having a PD-structure
will, in all likelihood, occur only if mutual cooperation is much more proﬁtable
than mutual defection.
However, to avoid over-stylization, this plausible hypothesis, before being ac-
cepted, has to be tested in ways that render its validity across diverse contexts
likely. One must carefully try to specify the conditions under which the hypoth-
esis will hold and those under which it will not hold.3
In specifying these conditions, we must be aware of the complexity and multi-
factorial nature of human decision making (see Güth 2000, for an overall frame-
work). Due to the different and partly competing motivations driving human
choices, claiming that players in PD games will cooperate only when ‘mutual
cooperation is much more proﬁtable than mutual defection’ is in the last re-
sort not sufﬁcient. It is very likely, for instance, that efﬁciency-minded decision
makers suppress all other concerns when the efﬁciency gains through mutual
cooperation are large. Then the observations would simply reveal that efﬁciency
concerns can become so important that they dominate all other motivations.
Overstating the generality of ﬁndings might have prevented the development
of more adequate theories paying attention to the limited scope of some results.
In the case of PD games, one would probably compare the efﬁciency gains from
mutual cooperation (1 in the example of Table 1) with the risk of unilateral de-
fection (11 in our example), and predict that efﬁciency concerns may become
dominant not only when ‘mutual cooperation is much more proﬁtable than mu-
tual defection’, but also if the risk arising from the other’s unilateral defection
is small. Elaborate ‘theories’ would not boldly claim general applicability, but
start out as qualitative ideas that must be elaborated in a piecemeal way via
more and more reﬁned empirical studies.
It is not by chance that theorists of human action ranging from Aristotle (in
his Topics) to Homans (1967) have insisted (the former) or at least conceded (the
latter) that, in view of the complexity of human cognitive and emotional pro-
cesses, general hypotheses about human behavior have to adopt the very weak
form of ‘topoi’ (in Aristotle ‘pay attention to x!’) or orientation hypotheses (in
Homans ‘x depends on y’) without specifying how exactly the relevant relations
operate and how things hang together. Of course, it would be better to have the-
ories that apply in a broad, rather than narrow, class of contexts. But, it would
be worse to entertain an illusion of knowledge without any warrant than not to
have broad theories at all.
3 Contrary to what most experimental economists seem to assume, the fact that hypotheses are
typically generated using extremely ‘stylized’ situations, with a neutral frame, does not justify
the claim of general validity.242 Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt and M. Vittoria Levati
On a very general level, it may be impossible to state much more than ‘man-
kind is a species whose individual members can be emphatic as well as ego-
centric, competitive as well as cooperative, risk seeking as well as risk averse,
inequ(al)ity seeking as well as inequ(al)ity averse, etc.’. We can say something
about generally relevant dimensions of problem solving and generally relevant
inﬂuences on its content. But can we generally say that one of the alternatives
is of overwhelming relevance? Isolating one dimension and focusing on it on the
basis of experimental evidence does not seem justiﬁable.
With respect to explaining human cooperation, this mode of operation typi-
cally neglects that there are situations where we are inclined to act pro-socially,
and others where we tend to behave in the opposite way. And, if we display such
variety in behavioral inclinations (as evolutionary arguments suggest), there are
good reasons for situation-speciﬁc behavior. Let us address a speciﬁc example.
3. On Inequ(al)ity Aversion
3.1 Benchmarks
What is seen as ‘fair’ in allocation behavior has been extensively discussed in
social psychology and led to the development of equity theory (Homans 1961;
Walster and Walster 1975). To illustrate equity theory, consider a simple reward
allocation game with allocator A and recipient R.4 Suppose that their respec-
tive positive contributions cA and cR linearly generate a monetary reward or
‘pie’ p according to p Æ®(cA ÅcR) with ®È0. Being aware of the individual con-
tributions, allocator A must distribute p between the two parties by ‘dictating’
that A receives uA, with 0 Ç uA · p, and R receives uR Æ p¡uA. According to
equity theory, the allocations of the pie should be proportional to contributions,







thereby acting as a good Aristotelian as described in book V. of the Nicomachean
Ethics (for a standard philosophical account, see Frankena 1966). Since when
the allocator distributes p the (costs of) contributions are sunk, this situation
may be called ‘a dictator experiment with a history’. Neglecting the history or
letting the pie descend like manna from heaven (as normally done by experimen-
tal economists5), equity suggests that the monetary pie should be split equally,
i.e., uA Æ uR Æ p/2.
Proportional or equal sharing characterizes resource allocations if fairness is
the only or, at least, the dominating concern (as perhaps in ‘gift splitting’). How-
ever, in many situations, people are not motivated solely by fairness, but have
other concerns, chief among them being their own material well-being. In such
situations, they may trade off fairness against a personal material advantage.
4 For early reward allocation studies, see Mikula 1973 and Shapiro 1975.
5 For exceptions, see Königstein 2000, or Gantner, Güth and Königstein 2001.(Over-)Stylizing Experimental Findings 243
In the attempt of ‘explaining’ data from a large set of laboratory observa-
tions, some recent models (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000)
have been able to incorporate such trade-off considerations into the utility func-
tion. Inequality aversion theories measure deviations from fairness via the dis-
tance from the equal share, and assume that individuals weigh these deviations
against the gains of deviating. These theories presuppose that equity coincides
with equality, thereby disregarding that, whenever cA/cR differs from 1, equal-
ity allocations contradict the ideal proportional sharing of equity theory—as ex-
pressed by condition (1).6
In the next section, we shall formulate the former analysis in somewhat more
general terms so as to capture the principal features of the experimentalists’
equ(al)ity theory.
3.2 A General Formulation
Let N=1, ..., n with n¸2 denote the set of individuals who have to allocate some
rewards among themselves. Assuming that individual i’s monetary success can













by ±, the basic idea
of inequality aversion can be characterized by an overall individual evaluation
function of the form
Ui(¢)Æ f (ui,±), (2)
which depends positively on ui and negatively on ±.7
According to (2), given ui, the situation that i considers as the best is the one
of equality in success where ± is the 0-vector. In other words, i enjoys best his
own success ui when
uj Æ uk for all j,k 2 N, j 6Æ k. (3)
Equity theory provides the hitherto most convincing answer to the query why
this may in fact be assumed. In any interactive situation in which classes of nor-
matively equivalent results can be formed and individual contributions cannot
be clearly ranked, the personal contribution standard (Güth 1988; 1994) can be
expressed via
cj Æ ck for all j,k 2 N, j 6Æ k. (4)
If personal standard (4) is used, then equity theory predicts that people should
allocate rewards so as to satisfy condition (3).
Equal share of the pie is often observed in ultimatum experiments without
entitlement in which the pie descends like manna from heaven. However, the
tenet does not apply generally: many proposers are found to offer between one
third and one half of the pie to the responder (see Camerer 2003 for a recent
6 For a recent criticism to this approach see Bergh 2008.
7 One can specify Ui in various ways. For instance, in the limit, one may assume that preferences
are lexicographic, allowing for no trade-off between ui and alternative values of ±, but factoring
in the latter if ui Æ u0
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survey). Hence, while some participants in the role of the proposer shy away
from greedy offers and propose the equal split instantaneously, others try to ﬁnd
out how far they can decrease the offer without causing own remorse or annoying
the responder. This kind of trade-off analyses are the basis of inequality aversion
theories, which formally capture how more success for oneself can compensate
remorse for taking advantage of inequality.
4. Lumpiness of Equ(al)ity Concerns
Although the basic formulation (2) of inequ(al)ity aversion needs not be contin-
uous, economists (following an established practice of the ﬁeld) have assumed
continuous relationships when specifying the trade-off between own success ui
and the inequality measures contained in ±. This implies that for any small gain
in success ui, one is willing to sacriﬁce condition (3) for some small inequality.
It is clearly convenient to rely on continuity and differentiability when ex-
ploring the implications of inequ(al)ity aversion analytically. From a method-
ological point of view, this convenience may justify the assumption of a contin-
uous trade-off relationship even though it implies some distortion of the facts.
But note that in the case at hand, this distortion seems to go beyond a mere
idealization that smoothes functional representations. It seems mistaken in a
more basic sense.
The experiment by Güth, Huck and Müller (2001) has shown that any inten-
tional (and thus avoidable) deviation from equ(al)ity brings in a kind of quali-
tative change. This means that an intentional deviation from (3) can be com-
pensated only by a considerable increase in ui if one wants to keep Ui(¢) con-
stant. Following Khalil (2004), we refer to this as the lumpiness of inequ(al)ity
aversion. This lumpiness casts some doubt on the continuity of the trade-off
relationship between one’s own success and inequ(al)ity measures.
5. Ambiguity of Equity Standards
Unlike implicitly assumed by theories of inequ(al)ity aversion, equity theory
does not offer unique benchmarks. Most importantly, condition (3) is just one
equity standard, namely the personal one where individual contributions are
either equal or cannot be ranked. In reward allocation experiments with costly
contributions, if cA/cR differs signiﬁcantly from 1, allocators tend to behave in
accordance with equity standard (1), thereby violating equality standard (3).8
Fairness is also ambiguous in ultimatum experiments where only the pro-
posers know the size of the pie. In particular, when p can be either small (p) or
large (p), with 0Ç p Ç p, most proposers with p Æ p want to appear fair by offer-
8 Deviations from proportional sharing are observed either when (1) favors the allocator or when
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ing p/2 instead of p/2 (Güth and Huck 1997). What is regarded as fair depends,
therefore, on the parties’ information.
The ambiguity of fairness standards has been known for a long time among
equity theorists. In economics, Selten (1978) has early on discussed the prob-
lem and recommended to restrict equity theory to situations where the fairness
standards are unique. This uniqueness requirement being rather restrictive,
Güth (1988; 1994) has suggested that equity theory is applicable even when
several fairness standards are suitable insofar as they can be ranked according
to some adequacy criterion. For instance, in the ultimatum experiments with
private information, it could be argued that only fair sharing of the small pie is
controllable. Thus, most responders will punish revealed unfairness (i.e., offers
that are unfair in view of p Æ p) and grant the beneﬁt of the doubt otherwise
(for a similar result in a stochastic trust game see Güth, Kliemt, Levati and von
Wangenheim 2007).
In light of these observations, inequality aversion theories should be limited
to situations in which the personal fairness standard (3)—based on equality in
allocations—is either the most obvious or at least the most likely accepted equity
benchmark.
6. Discussion
Recent theories of inequ(al)ity aversion like Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) have received quite some attention in the literature and in-
spired many applications. They are often used to account for empirical ﬁndings
that are not in line with the traditional homo oeconomicus model of economic
theory. Although these theories fare well in many contexts, in others they do
not. For instance, they do not seem to have much appeal in settings where in-
equ(al)ity concerns are not smooth or the equity standard is ambiguous.
In reward allocation situations where the perceived contributions of the par-
ties are different, equality in allocations contradicts the ideal proportional shar-
ing of equity theory and, thus, it may not be what people perceive as ‘fair’. Only
if the pie to be distributed descends like manna from heaven or the contributions
cannot be ranked, equality can be one of several equity standards, namely the
personal one.
Moreover, even when equal sharing is the predominant concern, there are
other important prerequisites for theories of inequ(al)ity aversion to hold such
as common observability of the pie. Many experimental studies (e.g., Güth, Huck
and Ockenfels 1996; Güth and Huck 1997; Güth et al. 2007) seem to indicate
that what people perceive as fair hinges on the parties’ information. A recent
contribution (Bicchieri and Chavez, forthcoming) shows that perceptions of fair-
ness depend also upon normative expectations (i.e., upon one’s beliefs about
what she ought to do in a situation).
Notwithstanding their ability to organize data from a wide variety of labo-
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theories in the conventional sense. They received a very warm welcome in the
economics community precisely because they are in line with the ‘do and do nots
of the trade’ (see Lakatos 1978). Indeed, economists not only adhere to conse-
quentialism, in normative economics they are also explanatory consequential-
ists: they explain human behavior exclusively in terms of the consequences that
the actors bring about by their actions.
Although modern decision and game theory allows to differentiate between
identical end states that are reached by a different path using different means
(see, for instance, Broome 1991, chap. 1), a consequentialist would explain ac-
tions by considering the properties of the end states only. If the best state is
simply the one yielding the highest monetary payoff—as assumed by the tra-
ditional approach, then rational choices can be accounted for by an evaluation
function that merely ranks the end states. Inequality aversion theories ‘reﬁne’
preferences by inserting distributional concerns into the utility function, but
still allow economists to abstract from the ways in which the distributional ef-
fects are brought about. Teleological explanations of actions can be based on
evaluations that do not take into account the path to the results to be evaluated.
By this means, the explanations become more powerful in that they generalize
over all actions that lead to the same consequences.
It seems that being outcome oriented has contributed very much to the suc-
cess of recent behavioral theories of the Fehr-Schmidt and Bolton-Ockenfels
type. The ample empirical evidence suggesting that behavior is not merely mo-
tivated by egoistic motives represented a threat to traditional economic model-
ing. The outcome-based models, which redeﬁne consequences (or the argument
of the utility functions) by assuming that individuals care about equ(al)ity, al-
lowed economists to neutralize this threat with minor repairs in the analytical
framework. From this perspective, the success of outcome-based models reveals
a more fundamental methodological problem of empirical, as opposed to “educ-
tive” (Binmore 1987; 2008), game theory: to acquire any generality the utility
functions must represent end-state oriented preferences.
Although end-state orientation and over-stylizing are different concepts,
over-stylizing contributes to sustain the illusion that explanations of human be-
havior based on expected consequences are possible. Special cases—like situa-
tions of gift splitting—seem to corroborate the hypothesis that utility functions
incorporating fairness concerns have the power to organize observations well.
These special cases would be representative of a more general class of situations
if only consequences mattered.
The typical theorist seems to be anxious to disregard this latter condition and
to over-stylize her hypothesis. Yet, one must not assume a priori that utilities
depend only on the material structure of the consequences. The identiﬁcation of
the preferences associated with each consequence may require, for instance, an
examination of what might have happened or of the means used to reach a spe-
ciﬁc end state. Going back to the initial examples, this means that we can claim
that ‘there exist cases in which distributional effects seem to prevail’. However,
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that generate them. Ignoring path-dependency and making general claims for a
broad class of proposer-responder interactions amount to over-stylizing.
Although we focused on inequ(al)ity aversion theories to illustrate the con-
cept of over-stylizing, we intended this to be just an example. The PD game
illustrated in Section 2 may serve as a warning that even the seemingly most
simple strategic interaction can be more complicated than one might imagine
from its matrix representation. Convoluted cognitive processes may be involved
even in games as simple as a two-by-two PD. Human decision making is compli-
cated not necessarily because decisions are complicated, but because the brain
that makes them is.
Context- and path-dependency will therefore always matter if human actors
and human perceptions are involved. We do not claim that each case is com-
pletely different. Analogies exist and may be generalized. However, experimen-
tal economists, just like lawyers, should generalize from ‘precedents’ in a case
by case manner and resist the temptation to act as if a covering law with ‘gen-
eral punch’ would be always present. Often, all one can say is that a paradigm
case had certain results in a speciﬁc experiment. Such a statement is much
better than not performing the experiment at all and abstains from formulat-
ing general hypotheses ranging over classes of games. It hands the task of a
slight generalization over to those who will use that experimental evidence to
deal with a yet unknown case.
Experimentalists should not let statistics range over heterogeneous experi-
ments unless they have a good reason for doing so—such as the test of a par-
ticular hypothesis. The observation that statistics organize well some data may
be interesting and useful for formulating further testable hypotheses. If these
hypotheses survive the subsequent tests, then there may be ground for a more
general theory. Mere inductive generalization from data will practically always
result in over-stylizing.
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